The article considers the phenomenon of price behavior in markets of joint products . It shows that conclusions about the nature of economic entities' behavior on this type of market could be inaccurate if the characteristics of these markets, such as joint costs, are not taken into account. For this purpose, a theoretical model, built according to basic micro economic principals, is applied. This model provides an opportunity to reveal -without further new institutional analysis -that the reason for price deviation from a competitive level does not always lie in actions restricting competition.
Introduction
This analysis is motivated by a sound antitrust case brought by the Federal Antitrust Services of Russia (hereafter FAS) against Russian companies in the 1 Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2015, No. 2, pp. 104-122. Three interconnected cases were brought against companies operating in the marthe market of chlorine was brought on the basis of an investigation launched by proving a price maintenance and market sharing agreement were revealed. The investigation was continued by other unscheduled inspections when corresponding documents were found. According to these documents, the cartel on the market of chlorine took place over 3.5 years and led to an increase in prices by a factor of 3.5 times. An investigation in the market of caustic soda was also based on unscheduled inspections and economic analysis that revealed a cartel operating since 2005
Despite the fact that in each case the antitrust authority possesses documents proving, as it seems, agreement, the conclusions of appellate courts where decisions by the FAS were contested were not unambiguous, which is the consequence of the peculiarities of these markets.
One of the key arguments of the FAS proving a price maintenance agreement is the fact that the domestic price of liquid caustic soda exceeds its export price (Artemiev et al., 2013, pp. 66-67) . According to the antitrust authority, this fact implies intensive competition on the foreign market and weak competition on the domestic market.
The case on the market of caustic soda ended up with the win of companies, and one of the decisive arguments was that there is constant relationship between the production of caustic soda and the production of chlorine, and this relationship explains the behavior of companies in corresponding markets.
The main goal of this study is to show, basing on the neoclassical model, that the difference in prices pointed out by FAS can be a consequence of the peculiarities of production and is not necessarily caused by a market structure. In turn, the approach of the antitrust authority that disregards these particularities could lead to errors of law enforcement (in this case -a type 1 error -unreasonable accusation).
The key particularity in the production of caustic soda is that the latter is protwo or more products are manufactured, these products are called joint products. Costs of production of this type of product are joint until the split-off point. In turn, the split-off point is the stage in the production process after which joint able proportions. The chemical industry provides a variety of examples of joint chlorine and caustic soda is one such example.
tant and particular case of caustic soda and chlorine but also beyond the chemical (continued) industry. In addition, analysis of this question shows that the tradition of hostility in antitrust revealed by Coase more than forty years ago (Coase, 1972) has a more complicated structure because even disregarding the tools of New Institutional in infringement of competition law.
of joint products based on other studies on this topic. The next three parts represent the model considered equilibrium conditions under competition and monopoly on markets of joint products, different reasons for a glut and wastage. In addition, the possibility of separate processing and transportation to a distant market (open economy) of a co-product is taken into account. The conclusion provides the results of the analysis.
Joint products
The question of joint products is a subject of a series of works based on microeconomic models taking into account their different particularities. In this way, Deutsch (1965, pp. 397-401) , using the example of the markets of chlorine and caustic soda in Canada, shows that complicated transportation and the moderate of markets. According to the Deutsch, the pricing policy of a company manufacturing these products is reminiscent of price discrimination on a territorial basis, but in reality, it could be the consequence of high transportation costs and a problem of the wastage of a glut.
Some articles concern the problem of cost allocations to joint products. Manes and Smith (1965, pp. 31-35) suggest an approach where costs are allocated according to the marginal revenue from sale of each of them. The authors also dea product as a by-product if it does not contribute to the sum of marginal revenue at an equilibrium point. This product should be disposed of at marginal revenue plied to a major product and the production of a by-product until the split-off point is assumed to be free of charge. If a by-product is separately processed the volume of its sale should correspond to the level where its marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of separate processing. Another article (Jensen, 1974, pp. 465-476) that also concerns the question of cost allocations to joint products a by-product) could differ from the marginal cost of separate processing. The reason is that the price of a by-product depends not only on cost of separate processing but also on opportunity cost of selling a by-product at the split-off point. If this price is negative, meaning that the alternative of separate processing is wastage involving cost, the price of the separately processed good is lower than marginal cost of separate processing.
In turn, Walters (1960) offers to employ the demand function for joint products in the form of probability distribution that enables high uncertainty level on markets for these products to be taken into account.
In one more article concerning joint products (Colberg, 1941, pp. 103-110) , the author explains the appearance of a glut (the difference between output and the volume sold) not only by limited demand for a product but also by the reasonproducts enables interdependence of their sales to be avoided, a company can decrease sales of one product keeping the sales of another product constant. In turn, ences wealth, market equilibrium, and the market power of a company, if it has one. Graham and Green (1984) use the concept of joint products (products manufactured from one input 2 ) in their analysis of households, where input is time and joint products are home production and leisure. -2002) . In particular, they study the relationship between demand for joint products and aggregate demand for their common input.
but does not study their interrelationship and a general effect on parameters of markets. This reveals a theoretical gap that impedes the analysis of the question under review using existing models. The new approach to modeling the decision-making process of a company manufacturing joint products and equilibrium on corresponding markets, based on the experience of preceding works, is elabo rated. The new prohibitively high cost of wastage), and the possibility of separate processing and transportation of a glut. The distinctive features of the new model are the following. First, it considers different reasons for a glut that enable the comparison of outcomes on competitive markets and monopolistic markets. Second, it takes into account the possibility of separate processing and transportation as the ways to dispose of a glut on a different market that is an alternative to wastage. This enables the comprehensive analysis of the effect of a glut on the parameters of markets.
The new model reveals probable law enforcement errors that take place on markets of joint products because the peculiarities of these markets are not taken into account by the antitrust authority.
Equilibrium on markets of joint products
interrelated, which means that the production of one product implies the production of type of product as follows. First, such a company cannot determine the optimal level much as they plan to sell. In the case of joint production, companies lose the ability to determine the optimal level of production of each product. Companies need to choose the level of sale of co-products and provide the possibility of achieving this level.
In summary:
provide the possibility of achieving the optimal level of sale of co-products.
of each product in one dimension. In the model offered the dimension chosen is the output of one of the products. This means that the demand for all products and corresponding marginal revenue are represented through output of this product . A major product is a product with the highest marginal revenue at the optimal point. 3 The output level of such a product then coincides with its sale level. For simplicity take output level of a major product as a dimension.
products. One of these products is a major product, and its output is equal to its level of sale. The second product is a co-product, and in particular circumstances its level of sale can differ from its output level. Assume the following reverse demand functions:
where Q 1 (Q 2 = 1 ), P 1 , P 2 a 1 , a 2 b 1 , b 2 Then, the marginal revenues from sale of each product have the following form:
revenue from sale of each product minus the cost of production. The latter in the case of joint production can be represented as a function of output of one of products. Representing joint costs as a function of a major product:
the optimal output of a major product and corresponding output of a co-product (see Appendix A).
(8)
The optimal level of sale of a major product always coincides with its output:
--1 * < 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0) or Q 1 * < Q 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0). Maximum revenue from sale achieved at the lowest marginal revenue. As far as marginal revenue is concerned a decreasing function of the level of sales ( / 1 ) < 0, the optimal level of sale is equal to the maximum possible level that is the whole output. This means
The second situation takes place when the optimal output of a major product the level where corresponding marginal revenue from the sale of the second 1 * > 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0) or Q 1 * > Q 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0). It is implies the appearance of a glut (X ) -the difference between the level of output and the level sale.
The level of sale of a co-product that can either coincide or not coincide with its is then the following:
where Q 2 Which of the underlined cases takes place depends on demand parameters (a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 ) and marginal cost (c) (see tion of marginal revenue) give an unambiguous effect of demand parameters (a 1 , a 2 a 1 high demand for a co-product (a 2 ) has the inverse effect. The effect of slopes of demand (b 1 , b 2 ) is uncertain and depends on the relationship between parameters.
).
Possible reasons for a glut
a glut, which is the difference between output and sold volume of a product.
A part of a co-product called a glut under some conditions is wasted. Assume that wastage of a glut involves no expense and consider possible reasons for its appearance.
pend on demand parameters and marginal cost. Assume that slopes of reverse demand functions are equal (b 1 = b 2 ence in demand for a major product and a co-product (a 1 > a 2 ) and hence in their corresponding marginal revenues.
This situation is represented on the graph below ( Fig. 1) , where MC -func-MR 1 , MR 2 -functions of marginal revenue of a major MR total -the sum of marginal reve-D 1 , D 2 -demand functions. The point of intersection of the marginal cost curve and the total marginal revenue curve takes place on the part of the latter that coincides with the marginal revenue of a major product. The optimal level of output of a major product is equal to Q 1 *. Fixed proportion 1:1 implies that output of a co-product is equal to the same amount. The optimal level of a coproduct sales is lower than its output and corresponds to the point where its revenue curve Q 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0). This leads to a glut of a co-product equal to Q 1 * -Q 1 (MR 2 (Q 1 ) = 0).
A glut can also appear when both markets are competitive but when demand a 1 > a 2 ) and marginal cost is low. This case is represented on the Fig. below (Fig. 2) , where D 1 , D 2 D total -the sum of this product on the market at a positive price is impossible.
The optimal output of a major product and the corresponding output of a co-Q 1 * that exceeds the amount, which can be sold under nonnegative price Q 1 (P 2 = 0). This implies the appearance of the glut equal to Q 1 * -Q 1 (P 2 = 0).
tion when a company possesses market power and a glut that is a result of limited mal to waste a part of a product. In the second case, a company in principle cannot sell part of a product on the market.
If the assumption that the sensitivities of demand in both markets are equal (b 1 b 2 ) is relaxed, there could be the situation where a product with a higher re-cantly lower than the sensitivity of demand of the second product (a 1 a 2 , b 1 > b 2 ).
while the marginal revenue from sale of the second product is positive. This implies that a product with a lower reserve price and higher sensitivity of demand is a major product, while a product with higher reserve price and lower sensitivity of demand is a co-product.
Wastage of a glut
When the wastage of a glut does not carry a cost, its appearance does not cost), wastage involves cost (moderate cost), wastage is impossible (prohibitively high cost).
for a company possessing market power to waste a part of a co-product, (2) it is impossible to sell a part of a co-product due to limited demand for this product on the market.
First, consider the problem of wastage when a glut appears due to the reason spect to two variables: output of a major product (Q 1 ) and the level of sale of a co-product (Q 2 its output level (Q 2 1 ). The demand function of a major product then corresponds to (1), while the demand function of a co-product differs from the demand function (2) and has the following form:
where a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , Q 1 , Q 2 P 1 , P 2 Functions of total and marginal costs correspond to equations (5) and (6). A glut is the difference between the output level of a co-product and its level of sale (12).
through the given parameters (see Appendix D). The result shows that the equa-Consider three situations underlined above: (1) wastage involves no cost (d cost (d > 0). = 0, then Q 2 1 *. This means that under ) output of a co-product and its optimal than its output, with a glut equal to ( 1 * -Q 2 jor product corresponds to the point where its marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost and sale of a co-product corresponds to the point where its marginal
The second case occurs when > 0. A glut is then impossible because Q 2 = 1 *. In this case the optimal output of a major product is less than output that corresponds to the point where its marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. The optimal level of sale of a co-product is greater than the level that corresponds
The third situation occurs when wastage is costly, meaning that d > 0. In comoutput of a major product is no longer equal to the amount at which marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, and the optimal level of sale of a co-product
The optimal output of a major product falls, and hence its optimal price increasprice decreases.
Consider the situation when a glut is impossible in greater detail. The distinctive feature of this situation is that a company moves its focus from a major product to a co-product, wastage of which is impossible. A company produces output of a major product. This situation is presented above under > 0, when 1 * = Q 2 age is impossible a company should produce as much as it can sell on the market Q 2 = 1 ). An additional constraint is also needed: a nonnegative price of a co-product to preserve the possibility of selling this product on the market.
Appendix C) we get:
We are interested only in cases with gluts. If = 1, a glut appears when optimal output of a major product is greater than the output at which the corresponding (Q 1 * > Q 1 (MR 2 = 0)). This gives Thus, if = 0, ( a 2 /b 2 ) -Q 1 the point where total marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost if the possibility of selling a co-product on this market is reserved. If > 0, Q 1 * = a 2 /b 2 . Then, outputs of both products fall below the level where total marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. If the parameters of demand and cost functions lead to such an output of ing the corresponding output of a co-product on the market, then this output of a major product is optimal. When wastage is impossible, output and volume of sale of a co-product correspond to the level where its marginal revenue is below is determined, meaning that when wastage is impossible, the main condition for determining the volume of sale of a co-product is to charge for the latter nonnegative price.
sponds to such an output of a co-product that a part of this output cannot be sold on a market, then the optimal output of a major product is equal to the maximum level at which the corresponding output of a co-product can be sold on the market.
Next, consider the situation when a glut appears due to the second reason, not sell a part of a co-product on the market. This situation takes place when a company makes a decision under condition of competition. Then, P 1 , P 2 are prices of To let a company choose the optimal output assume increasing marginal cost ( / 1 ) > 0). If there is a glut on the competitive market, a company sells a maximum vol-Q 2
When wastage of a glut does not involve additional cost (d = 0),
When marginal cost of wastage is positive ( d > 0),
This can be expressed as P 1 = MC(Q 1 *) + pd or P 1 -pd = MC(Q 1 *). This means that under positive cost of wastage the optimal output of a major product and corresponding output of a co-product fall.
If wastage is impossible, the output of a co-product should be equal to the maximum possible level of sale of a co-product ( 1 * = Q 2 a major product is then proportional to the maximum level of a co-product that can be sold on the market (see Appendix C).
The model constructed gives an opportunity to make the following suppositions about the markets of chlorine and caustic soda in Russia. First, the technological characteristics of chlorine and caustic soda are such that wastage of both products involves additional cost, and in the case of caustic soda, the cost is prohibitively high. According to the model, if there is a glut of caustic soda, then its output level should correspond to its optimal level of sale. This leads to the situation when the real optimal output of chlorine is lower than its optimal output as if peculiarities of chlorine's production and impossibility of caustic's wastage the corresponding optimal level. This rule is valid either if a company has market power or is under competitive conditions. Second, if there is a glut of chlorine, then a company needs to take into account the cost of wastage of chlorine when it determines its optimal level of output and sale. Then, the real optimal output of caustic soda is lower than the optimal output that does not take into account peculiarities of production and cost of wastage of chlorine. In turn, the real optimal output of chlorine is higher than the corresponding optimal level because an alternative for sale of the latter is wastage that involves additional cost.
Third, an additional observation is the fact that if the market of caustic soda is competitive, then for a company to make a decision to sell this product on the market its price should be higher than the marginal cost because in addition to the latter, the unavoidable cost of wastage of chlorine is taken into account.
Separate processing and an open economy
In the analysis above the only way to let output and the level of sale of a coproduct to differ is the wastage of a glut. The possibility of separate processing or sale of a product on a distant market (including export) adds a new market to the model. In this analysis a new market is considered as a way to dispose of in the case of a glut may separately process and sell it on a different market or transportation. These costs have a similar effect on market equilibrium and are considered jointly. Assume that the marginal costs of separate processing or transportation are constant and equal to f -rately processed or transported to a distant market (Q 2 of selling a co-product on a new market is considered only as a way to dispose of a glut, the volume of sale of a co-product on a new market cannot exceed a glut.
This condition is stricter than Q 2 1 , and hence if it holds, the later holds automatically.
market objective a company should possess no less market power on it in comparimarket and consider two cases.
1. A company has market power both on an "old" market and on a new market . and the demand function for a co-product on a new market has the following form:
where a 2 b 2 Q 2 P 2 0. A glut is equal to the difference between output and the level of sales of a coproduct (see 12). = 1).
sider three cases: (1) wastage involves no cost (d = 0), (2) wastage involves cost (d > 0), (3) wastage is impossible (there should be no glut) (see Appendix C). If = 0, then Q 1 * -Q 2 Q 2 d = 0. Then, a company separately processes or transports such amount of a co-product that marginal revenue from its sale on a new market is equal to the cost of separate processing or transportation.
In the second case, d > 0. This implies that a company is ready to sell a glut on a new market even if marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost of separate processing or transportation.
If > 0, then Q 1 * -Q 2 Q 2 impossible. The optimal volume of sale of a glut is then higher than the volume that corresponds to equality of marginal revenue and marginal cost of separate processing or transportation. In this case the optimal output of a major product falls and the optimal level of sale of a co-product rises.
2. A new market is competitive, and on an "old" market a company has market power. Then, P 2 max = max (a 2 -b 2 Q 2 )Q 2 + (a 1 -b 1 Q 1 )Q 1 -TC(Q 1 ) -
ditions (see Appendix C). If = 0, then Q 1 * -Q 2 Q 2 d = 0. The company does not then separately process or transport a glut if price on a new market is lower than the marginal cost of separate processing or transportation.
In the second case, d > 0. The acceptable price for a company to sell a part of a glut or the whole glut on a new market then positively relates to the cost of separate processing or transportation and negatively relates to the cost of wastage.
If > 0, then Q 1 * -Q 2 Q 2 age is impossible. The acceptable price for a company to sell the whole glut then falls under the marginal cost of separate processing or transportation. This in turn explains the phenomenon when a company exports a product bearing losses. If it is impossible to sell a glut on a new market at a positive price (Q 2 of a major product should be equal to the volume where corresponding output of Q 1 * = Q 2 when wastage is possible: to sell a glut or not. When the wastage of a glut is impossible, a company has to sell it at any price. As far as negative price is not taken into account and means that a company cannot sell a glut on this market, a compa-Q 1 * = Q 2 Q 2 3. There also could be the case when both markets are competitive. The vol-
tions it is possible to make the following conclusions according to the three cases underlined above (see Appendix C). If = 0, Q 1 -Q 2 Q 2 duction if d = 0, and in addition the cost of wastage if d > 0. A glut is then sold on a new market if its price is equal to the cost of separate processing or transportation if d = 0 and can be even lower if d > 0.
If > 0, wastage is impossible and Q 1 * -Q 2 Q 2 = 0. This implies that a glut (Q 2 = Q 1 * -Q 2 rate processing or transportation. If a co-product cannot be sold on a new market (Q 2 = 0) at a positive price, this turns us back to the situation when output of a major product is determined according to the possibility of selling a co-product on the market (Q 1 = Q 2 its price is above the marginal cost of production.
of alternative strategies of a company with respect to a glut, in particular: sale of a glut on a new market.
Return to the example with chlorine and caustic soda. Technological characteristics of chlorine imply that it should be sold within three days after produc-tion. This means that transportation of chlorine to distant markets is impossible.
which offers an opportunity to sell a glut of chlorine on a new market (downmoderate cost that enables sale of a glut of caustic soda on a distinct market. According to the model, if wastage is impossible, as it is in the case of caustic soda, a company agrees to sell a glut even at a price below the cost of transportation both if the company has market power on a new market and under competitive conditions. Thus, with respect to domestic price is not the consequence of more intensive competition on a foreign market, but is the way of selling a glut. If sale of caustic on a new market is impossible, the price of chlorine exceeds the marginal costs of production even under competitive conditions on the market of chlorine.
If there is a glut of chlorine, then a company's decision about its separate processing depends on the market structure of chlorinated derivatives and hence on the price at which a company can sell its product on this market because there is an alternative in the form of wastage in the case of chlorine. If the market of chlori-rine even if the price on the market of chlorinated derivatives is below the marginal cost of separate processing because cost of wastage that a company incurs other-conditions of this market demand because the cost of wastage is taken into account. Thus, in addition to joint costs of production and demand for each product the factor that determines equilibrium is cost of wastage. The higher the cost of and hence the lower its price on a new market. Other factors are costs of separate processing and transportation. Then, a company needs to choose between separate processing (transportation) and sale at the split-off point. and after separate processing or transportation can differ from their optimal values if the markets of each product are considered separately disregarding negative externalities connected with a glut, of which wastage involves costs.
Conclusion
that prices and the levels of sale of joint products are different from these parameters as if there is no joint production, cost of wastage and the possibility of separate processing and transportation.
If the antitrust authority investigates markets of joint products, it should take into account the peculiarities of these markets (especially in the absence of direct evidence). Otherwise, this could result in wrong conclusions about the nature of companies' behavior and hence errors of law enforcement. The engagement of experts of each industry under investigation who can provide comprehensive of antitrust policy tools (Schmalensee, 2012) . This could improve the balance of the type 1 and the type 2 errors in law enforcement practice.
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